Semantic normativity and the objectivity of legal argumentation

Authors

  • Matthias Klatt Universidade de Hamburgo
  • Felipe Oliveira de Sousa Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4013/424

Abstract

With regard to its importance, Jürgen Habermas compared Robert Brandom’s Making It Explicit with A Theory of Justice. This paper investigates the significance of Brandom’s philosophy of meaning to legal interpretation. The focus of attention is whether the meaning of a norm can constrain legal interpretation. The questions of the determinacy and the objectivity of law are at issue. Both debates are dealt with by arguments from the philosophy of meaning. Because of the open texture of law and because of the vagueness of language, which is one of the burdens of judgment, judges have discretion in the application of law. The topic here is, whether and to what extent the meaning of the norm can serve to reduce this discretion. Both the legitimacy and the objectivity of judicial decisions depend on this.

Key words: semantic normativity, objectivity, legal argumentation, norm, meaning.

Author Biographies

Matthias Klatt, Universidade de Hamburgo

Filosofia do Direito

Felipe Oliveira de Sousa, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul

Filosofia do Direito

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Published

2011-04-04

Issue

Vol. 2 No. 2 (2010): July/December

Section

Articles

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