The expressive function of folk psychology

Autores/as

  • Victor Fernandez Castro University of Granada, Spain

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2017.181.05

Resumen

The aim of this paper is to present a challenge to the received view in folk psychology. According to this challenge, the semantic assumption behind the received view, which considers that propositional attitude ascriptions are descriptions of the internal causally efficacious states underlying behavior, cannot account for the main function of reasons in terms of mental states.

Keywords: folk psychology, propositional attitudes ascriptions, reasons, expressivism, descriptivism.

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Biografía del autor/a

Victor Fernandez Castro, University of Granada, Spain

Ph.D. student at University of Granada, Spain. After graduating in philosophy and receiving his MSc in Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences, he has been granted a fellowship of the Programme for the Training of Researchers of the Spanish Government. His primary research interests are Philosophy of Psychology and Mind, and he is particularly concern with issues such as social cognition, inner speech and metacognition.

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Publicado

2017-05-24

Cómo citar

FERNANDEZ CASTRO, V. The expressive function of folk psychology. Filosofia Unisinos / Unisinos Journal of Philosophy, São Leopoldo, v. 18, n. 1, p. 36–46, 2017. DOI: 10.4013/fsu.2017.181.05. Disponível em: https://www.revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2017.181.05. Acesso em: 3 jun. 2025.

Número

Vol. 18 Núm. 1 (2017): Janeiro/Abril

Sección

Artigos

Licencia

Concedo a revista Filosofia Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy o direito de primeira publicação da versão revisada do meu artigo, licenciado sob a Licença Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (que permite o compartilhamento do trabalho com reconhecimento da autoria e publicação inicial nesta revista).

Afirmo ainda que meu artigo não está sendo submetido a outra publicação e não foi publicado na íntegra em outro periódico e assumo total responsabilidade por sua originalidade, podendo incidir sobre mim eventuais encargos decorrentes de reivindicação, por parte de terceiros, em relação à autoria do mesmo.