The expressive function of folk psychology

Authors

  • Victor Fernandez Castro Philosophy Department i, Universidad de Granada

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2017.181.05

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to present a challenge to the received view in folk psychology. According to this challenge, the semantic assumption behind the received view, which considers that propositional attitude ascriptions are descriptions of the internal causally efficacious states underlying behavior, cannot account for the main function of reasons in terms of mental states.

Keywords: folk psychology, propositional attitudes ascriptions, reasons, expressivism, descriptivism.

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Author Biography

Victor Fernandez Castro, Philosophy Department i, Universidad de Granada

Departamento de Filosofia I, Universidad de Granada, Spain.

 

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Published

2017-05-24

How to Cite

FERNANDEZ CASTRO, V. The expressive function of folk psychology. Filosofia Unisinos / Unisinos Journal of Philosophy, São Leopoldo, v. 18, n. 1, p. 36–46, 2017. DOI: 10.4013/fsu.2017.181.05. Disponível em: https://www.revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2017.181.05. Acesso em: 24 may. 2025.

Issue

Vol. 18 No. 1 (2017): January/April

Section

Articles

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