Logical normativity in Hegel and Brandom
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2019.201.02Abstract
The research is articulated in three moments. Initially, the position of Brandom is presented, explaining the pragmatic-semantic normativity, that is, the pragmatic-semantic theory of Brandom’s linguistic reason. What is the difference between the inferential semantics of the Brandomian theory of language and the relational semantics of the Hegelian theory of thinking? After that, normativity is debated in Hegel’s logic, that is, his theory of the alienation of the thought of itself in the circularity and the contradiction in the logic of the essence, having as background the norm of truth exposed in the logic of the concept. Finally, to the idealistic realism of the concept, in which Brandom and Hegel coincide, is opposed philosophical realism as its permanent challenge.
Keywords: pragmatics, semantics, normativity, idealism, realism.
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