Racionalidade e erros cognitivos

os limites da concepção individualista do conhecimento no enfrentamento dos poluentes epistêmicos

Abstract

This article aims to show that virtue epistemology has limitations in addressing the problem of epistemic pollutants. Virtue epistemologists believe that if individuals possess the appropriate intellectual virtues, they will be capable of avoiding and rejecting dubious information. I argue that this optimism is unfounded because epistemic pollutants tend to be reproduced in forms that resemble legitimate information. This poses a problem as it impacts the ability of ordinary people to distinguish between reliable and unreliable sources. The situation becomes even more critical when biases come into play. Biases are inclinations, prejudices, or predispositions that affect the way we think, judge, and make decisions. The issue is that biases often unconsciously interfere with the processes of belief formation and endorsement, leading people to accept misleading information simply because it tends to confirm their preexisting beliefs and worldviews. Thus, we observe that a significant portion of the beliefs we adopt and endorse are not the result of acts of intellectual virtue but rather the outcome of biased cognitive processes.