Aristotle on Human Being as an ΕΙΔΟΣ and a Collection of ΕΙΔH

Abstract

This paper focuses on the pivotal question concerning the human eîdos in Aristotle’s natural and political philosophy: whether the human eîdos is divisible or indivisible for Aristotle? If the human eîdos is divisible, why does Aristotle claim that human being is an éschaton eîdos which admits of no differentiation? But if it is indivisible, why does Aristotle claim that the city is composed of human beings who “differ in eîdos”? I answer the question by distinguishing between two kinds of human eîdos as actuality in Aristotle: the human eîdos as first actuality (human eîdosA1) and the human eîdos as second actuality (human eîdosA2). I argue that human eîdos in the sense of human eîdosA1 is indivisible for Aristotle, but in the sense of human eîdosA2, it can be divided into multiple eidē which are manifested in various human functions and ways of life.