Review, critique and principles for an alternative answer to the fundamentals of Aristotle's demonstration of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC)

Abstract

One of the issues about the Aristotle's defence of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) in Metaphysics Γ4 is the localization of the basic condition from which he refutes the opponent of this principle. The expected result of the accomplishment of this basic condition is the obtainment of something determined (ὡρισμένον), the minimal evidence of the validity of the PNC(1006a24-26). Thus, the objective of this article is to present the basic ideas of a group of authors (Aubenque, Cassin, Zingano and Zillig) who, rightly, place the answer to this problem in the perspectives of the Aristotelian understanding of meaningful language – saying something (μόνον τι λέγῃ) (1006a12-13). We will try to show that they all tend to provide such an answer based on the analysis of the external aspect of reciprocal discourse – saying something to someone else (ἄλλῳ) (1006a23-24;1006b10). However, we will present the limits of this interpretation and some reasons for the defense of an answer on the fundamental of the Aristotelian demonstration of the PNC from an analysis of the internal discourse – saying something for oneself (αὑτῷ) (1006a23;1006b11).