The argument from design in the work of David Hume and its relation to the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

Abstract

The argument from design used to prove the existence of God is one of the arguments to which David Hume has devoted the most attention. On the one hand, this analogical reasoning is based on observational evidence. For that reason, it could be considered a particularly attractive type of argument for an empiricist philosopher. In fact, Hume uses this a posteriori argument in several of his works. On the other hand, Hume's position on this type of reasoning is not entirely clear. The philosopher defends this argument on several occasions and criticizes it on others. This paper aims to investigate Hume's analysis of the argument from design. In particular, we will highlight the peculiarities of the philosopher's remarks in the Dialogues on natural religion. We will analyze the significance of Hume's position in the Dialogues regarding the so-called "Philon's conversion". We will show that "Philo's conversion" at the end of the work could represent the positive scope that Hume attributes to this type of arguments in his theoretical philosophy.