The Social as a normative condition for social justice

Abstract

This research, entitled “The Social as a Normative Condition for Social Justice” delves into the concept of the ‘Social’ (Das Soziale) and its potential semantic-normative development for constructing social justice. Social justice is understood as ensuring the minimum conditions for social existence. This research addresses critical theory and social philosophy to examine the ‘Social’ as social practices, relationships, and institutions, positioning it as paradigmatic. The central questions are: 1) How do social practices, relationships, and institutions contribute to social justice? 2) How can these elements, particularly institutions, be reoriented from mere analysis to active correction and stabilization of social reality? Jaeggi’s work on social practices and institutions provides a foundation for this inquiry. She argues that social practices are not only performed but must also be understood intersubjectively, establishing meaning and enabling actions. The relevance of this research extends beyond philosophical discourse to address pressing global challenges in politics and society. The erosion of social trust and increasing inequality underscore the need for robust social institutions that can correct and stabilize social realities. By redefining institutions not only as analytical constructs but as active agents of social justice, this research aligns with global efforts to promote equitable and just societies.