Political costs in financial institutions in face of the resolution 3.518/07 BACEN

Abstract

The positive theory of accountancy by the opportunist perspective has the political cost hypothesis. The political cost hypothesis supposes that big companies may be subject to the political costs through the State regulation or regulatory bodies, by the evidence of high gains by it demonstrated and by the visibility of the market. As the political costs, it has the cost of monitoring, service, lobbying, procedural and evidential. In this context, the aim of this article is to identify the value of the political costs in the financial statements from the financial institutions occurred by the advent of the Resolution 3.518/07 from the Central Bank of Brazil. This resolution coordinates the charge of taxes of the provide services by financial institutions. The research is descriptive and documental with a quantitative approach. It was analyzed income statements from the first to the third trimester of 2008. The population included the 10 biggest banks in relation to the total active, according to Central Bank of Brazil classification. The research result shows a reduction of the revenues with the provide services. This resolution resulted in a reduction of revenues with the provide services from 753 million (5,65%) comparing the revenues from the first with the second trimester of 2008; R$ 995 million (7,47%) comparing the revenues from the first to the third trimester of 2008, and R$ 242 million (1,93%) comparing the revenues of the second with the third trimester of 2008.

Key words: political cost, accounting regulation, resolution 3.518/07.