New objections to the problem of unconceived alternatives

Autores/as

  • Seungbae Park Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2019.202.03

Resumen

The problem of unconceived alternatives can be undermined, regardless of whether the possibility space of alternatives is bounded or unbounded. If it is bounded, pessimists need to justify their assumption that the probability that scientists have not yet eliminated enough false alternatives is higher than the probability that scientists have already eliminated enough false alternatives. If it is unbounded, pessimists need to justify their assumption that the probability that scientists have not yet moved from the possibility space of false alternatives to the possibility space of true alternatives is higher than the probability that scientists have already moved from the former to the latter space.

Keywords: changing spaces, Humean skepticism, scientific pessimism, scientific realism.

 

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Biografía del autor/a

Seungbae Park, Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology

Seungbae Park is a philosophy professor of philosophy at Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology in the Republic of Korea. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Arizona in 2001, having specialized in philosophy of science under the guidance of Prof. Richard Healey. He taught at the University of Arizona, the University of Maryland, and POSTECH, before coming to his current institution in 2009.

 

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Publicado

2019-09-13

Cómo citar

PARK, S. New objections to the problem of unconceived alternatives. Filosofia Unisinos / Unisinos Journal of Philosophy, São Leopoldo, v. 20, n. 2, p. 138–145, 2019. DOI: 10.4013/fsu.2019.202.03. Disponível em: https://www.revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2019.202.03. Acesso em: 23 may. 2025.

Número

Vol. 20 Núm. 2 (2019): Maio-Ago

Sección

Artigos

Licencia

Concedo a revista Filosofia Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy o direito de primeira publicação da versão revisada do meu artigo, licenciado sob a Licença Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (que permite o compartilhamento do trabalho com reconhecimento da autoria e publicação inicial nesta revista).

Afirmo ainda que meu artigo não está sendo submetido a outra publicação e não foi publicado na íntegra em outro periódico e assumo total responsabilidade por sua originalidade, podendo incidir sobre mim eventuais encargos decorrentes de reivindicação, por parte de terceiros, em relação à autoria do mesmo.