Schelling vs. Hegel: Negativity in inversion

Autores/as

  • Brigita Gelzinyte Vilnius University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2018.192.06

Resumen

Paper explores the controversial relationship between Schelling and Hegel with respect to the role of negativity. By rejecting the common framework, according to which, one of the authors is usually presented as either advancing or preceding the other, it argues for an alternative synchronic reading which approaches this relationship not in terms of surpassing, subordination or perversion but rather presents it as an inversion. By discussing (a) the negativity of reflection, (b) the ontological interpretation of the transcendental object and (c) the application of dialectics, it proposes an amphibolic elaboration of commonly shared presuppositions—a movement following a similar path yet in converse directions, which in its own turn challenges our common understanding of German idealism.

Keywords: Schelling, Hegel, inversion, concept, negativity, reflection, dialectics.

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Publicado

2018-11-01

Cómo citar

GELZINYTE, B. Schelling vs. Hegel: Negativity in inversion. Filosofia Unisinos / Unisinos Journal of Philosophy, São Leopoldo, v. 19, n. 2, p. 156–160, 2018. DOI: 10.4013/fsu.2018.192.06. Disponível em: https://www.revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2018.192.06. Acesso em: 23 may. 2025.

Número

Sección

Philosophy South