Different kinds of decisions and an experiment on unconscious generation of free decisions: A conceptual analysis
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2015.161.03Resumen
Philosophical issues such as free will and the role of consciousness in human action have become a topic of interest to neuroscience. While this contribution is of great value to extend our knowledge on these issues, the lack of clarity about the concepts being investigated may interfere with the interpretation of the relevant results. An interesting experiment (Bode et al., 2011) that investigates whether decisions are generated consciously or unconsciously suggests a conclusion about whether human beings decide freely. These issues are considered relevant philosophical issues, but the experiment lacks conceptual precision, and this weighs on the interpretations of data and results. I argue that further conceptual analysis of decisions shows that the experiment investigates one kind of decision, while it unwarrantedly draws conclusions about human decisions in general. A better understanding of what is considered to be a decision helps clarify to which extent the results show that decisions are generated unconsciously. This shows that conceptual precision is crucial for research on the area as well as methodological rigor.
Keywords: decision, intention, consciousness, brain activity.
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Concedo a revista Filosofia Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy o direito de primeira publicação da versão revisada do meu artigo, licenciado sob a Licença Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (que permite o compartilhamento do trabalho com reconhecimento da autoria e publicação inicial nesta revista).
Afirmo ainda que meu artigo não está sendo submetido a outra publicação e não foi publicado na íntegra em outro periódico e assumo total responsabilidade por sua originalidade, podendo incidir sobre mim eventuais encargos decorrentes de reivindicação, por parte de terceiros, em relação à autoria do mesmo.








