On the naturalization of Fregean senses

Resumen

In several works that start from the seminal text Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories, Ruth Millikan has presented her well know teleosemantic approach to philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. Millikan presents her theory of linguistic signs as a theory which, unlike other semantic theories, is able to more adequately solve problems such as that which is called “Freges’s puzzle”. Millikan considers that the Fregean modes of presentation are inconsistent with a representational theory of mind. In this paper, the relevance of Millikan’s objections to Frege is evaluated and the scope of these objections is discussed in the context of her own conception. We conclude that Millikan’s analysis of Fregean semantics relies on false assumptions and, in consequence, her doctrine is weakened.

Keywords: teleosemantic theory, Fregean semantics, senses, identity.