On the Adequacy of Attitude-Ascriptions

Resumen

Fregeans and Russellians defend different conceptions on the truth-conditions of reports of attitude ascriptions. Very often, they appeal to our intuitions and to pragmatic aspects to support their view. In this paper I propose a principle of adequacy of attitude-ascriptions. In the first section, I review the old puzzle concerning the failure of the principle of substitution salva veritate in attitude ascriptions. In the second section, I present my principle, which is based on the claim that by choosing a designator for an attitude-ascription a competent speaker is usually oriented by her supposition of the hearer’s epistemic state concerning the referent. In section 3, I apply my conception to some traditional tricky examples of attitude ascriptions in the literature. In section 4, I argue that even in non-standard situations (e.g. context of irony) a competent speaker must take into account the hearer’s epistemic state. Then, in the fifth section I suggest a consequence of my proposal for the discussion on exportation. Finally, in the concluding remarks I sketch some thoughts about the possibility of extending my pragmatic proposal to a semantic account of the truth-conditions of attitude-ascriptions.

Keywords: Attitude ascriptions, exportation, contextualism, pragmatic adequacy.