An argument against the thesis of the ontological subjectivity of consciousness in John Searle’s biological naturalism

Abstract

John Searle claims that consciousness is ontologically subjective, since conscious mental phenomena only exist as long as they are experienced. Therefore, mental phenomena are essentially conscious, insofar as their mental character depends on their connection with consciousness. However, to align (a) the acceptance of unconscious mental phenomena with (b) his Cartesian view of consciousness (as the essence of the mind), Searle defends (c) adispositional account of the unconscious. The problem is that some cases of unconscious mental causation require that certain decisive mental properties (sensorial and intentional properties) exist in an occurrent way, and not merely as dispositions. By accepting unconscious mental causation, Searle (inadvertedly) commits himself to a mental existence that isindependent from consciousness. Such unconscious existence implies that certain mental phenomena are ontologically objective, and not subjective as he claims, because they exist without being experienced.

Keywords: Ontological subjectivity, unconscious, disposition, mental causation, objectivity.