Intentionality and Umwelt
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2018.192.01Abstract
The paper seeks to analyze the notion of intentionality according to Jakob von Uexküll’s theory. Also following John Searle’s biological naturalism, its aim is to present the philosophical meaning of the notion of Umwelt and to show that it can offer an alternative approach to the traditional intellectualist perspectives on intentionality that consider it to be an internal and representational property of the mental states. According to a philosophical non-representationalist perspective on intentionality, the article also tries to trace the ancestral relation between the notions of Umwelt and enaction. The proposal of the paper is therefore to explore the conceptual elements that can be drawn from the notion of Umwelt in the philosophy of mind and to show that it means an intentional structure without mediation of internal representation of the states of the organism.
Keywords: intentionality, Umwelt, Uexküll, philosophy, mind.
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