Deontic logic and adaptive algorithms: The relevance of explicit benefit in versions of the selection task

Abstract

Social contract theory argues that to properly execute thematic versions of the selection task one has to specify, in the rules of such versions, an explicit benefit that can only be achieved in exchange for meeting a requirement. By contrast, from the point of view deontic logic, it is sufficient that the rule is expressed in terms of a deontic rule. In this paper, I analyze an experiment presented by Cosmides, Barrett and Tooby with the goal of demonstrating that, for social contract theory, an explicit benefit is indeed necessary. My purpose is to check whether the outcomes of that experiment support the thesis of social contract theory and invalidate the assumptions of the approach of deonticlogic. I conclude that although the experiment by Cosmides, Barrett and Tooby does show that the idea of deontic logic is questionable, it does not really demonstrate that social contract theory is the correct one.

Key words: adaptive algorithms, deontic logic, explicit benefit, selection task, social contract.