Essentialism, reference and the necessary A posteriori

Abstract

This paper elaborates on the epistemological incongruencies and shortcomings identified in Kripke’s view on reference. I question the consistency of Kripke’s notion of a posteriori necessity and show that all purported examples of necessary a posteriori truth are in principle amenable to a priori knowledge. The relevance of the notion of epistemic modality is also put in doubt, at least in a realist framework. This conforms not only to Kantian usage, but also to the actual way we use names and natural kind terms. Conclusions about a more permissive view of reference that conciliates causal and descriptivist theories, but also essentialism and the skepticism engendered by any valid assessment of the limits of human knowledge, are supplemented by examples and arguments showing that our overall conception about the nature of reality and knowledge reflects strongly upon our view of language and reference.

Key words: essentialism, theory of reference, epistemic possibility, a priori, a posteriori, Saul Kripke, Scott Soames.