The problem of universals

Abstract

This work discusses several proposals about the nature of the so-called “problem of universals” or “one over many”. First, it is argued that the problem has nothing to do with a conceptual or semantic analysis about predication or resemblance. The properties that – supposedly – would be justified by the considerations to which the problem of universals leads are determined ‘scarce’ properties whose existence should be a matter of a posteriori research and not a priori reflection. In second place, it is argued that the problem has nothing to do with the ontological commitment one may have acquired by saying or thinking something. Everyone in the current debate in the metaphysics of properties would accept that if, say, a is F and b is F, then there is something that both a and b are. The problem lies in the nature of the entity referred to and attributed both to a and b. Considerations of ontological commitment alone are useless for the discrimination between the different alternative theories by which these entities have been understood. Neither can the problem be understood as a problem about how a single object can have different properties (many over one), for the properties are conceived from the beginning by all the parties in the debate as capable of multiple instantiation. Finally, it is rejected that the problem of universals is a problem about truthmakers. The problem has nothing special to do with sentences of a language or propositions. It is not a semantic problem, but simply an ontological one about how the ‘same’ nature can be instantiated in a plurality of exemplifications.

Key words: properties, universals, ontological commitment, truthmakers.