Wittgenstein and skepticism

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2026.271.03

Keywords:

skepticism, certainty, doubt, Wittgenstein.

Abstract

The article intends to support the idea that Wittgenstein, despite reservations, still considers that there is a kind of truth in skepticism. For this purpose, it is assumed that looking at the text of On Certainty will be instructive in order to elucidate what exactly it consists of and what is the meaning of this alleged truth.

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Published

2026-05-07

How to Cite

TEMP, D. Wittgenstein and skepticism. Filosofia Unisinos / Unisinos Journal of Philosophy, São Leopoldo, v. 27, n. 1, p. 1–11, 2026. DOI: 10.4013/fsu.2026.271.03. Disponível em: https://www.revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/28647. Acesso em: 8 may. 2026.

Issue

Vol. 27 No. 1 (2026): Jan-Abr

Section

Articles

License

Copyright (c) 2025 Daniel Temp

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