Civil disobedience as a right of defense in Rawls and an attempt to respond to Raz’s criticism

Abstract

The text exposes, in general terms, Rawls' theory of civil disobedience, in order to highlight the definition of civil disobedience as a right. It is intended to show that it is an individual right, although its exercise may also present political traits. Next, it presents Raz's theory in the sense of denying that civil disobedience is a right. Ad argumentandum tantum, Raz's objection is taken as well-founded, in order to scrutinize some consequences that such a formulation have for Rawls' theory, specifically regarding the justification of civil disobedience as a right. Finally, it scrutinizes possible responses that could be offered in response to Raz, especially from Rawls' perspective. It is argued that this implies the need for a reconstruction of Rawls' theory of disobedience as a theory of resistance.