Recognition in Honneth’s theory of formal ethical life and the Thompson’s critique:
the problem of constitutive power
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2023.241.03Keywords:
Recognition, ethical life, Honneth, Thompson, Constitutive Power.Abstract
This article aims to approach the Honneth’s theory of recognition from two perspectives: at first approaches the spheres of recognition from a formal ethical life purpose that maintain both universal and contextual aspects inherent to self-realization processes. Secondly, presents Thompson’s critique of Honneth according to which recognition’s theory fails for two main reasons: (i) it is unable to deal with the dynamics and effects of social power, that is, it dispenses with an ontological analysis of “constitutive power” and “constitutive domination”; (ii) it focuses on the intersubjective practices of recognition and forgets to focus on the normative structures and systems of functional integration.
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Copyright (c) 2022 Francisco Jozivan Guedes de Lima
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