What is the elimination of a(n) (ir)relevant alternative?

Abstract

Herein we propose a complete analysis of the knowledge of corrigible propositions by non-reflective agents. Our proposal absorbs some requirements of the relevant alternatives theory (RAT). More specifically, our proposal absorbs the requirement that the target-belief justifier must eliminate alternatives so that the generated belief can be converted into knowledge. In absorbing this requirement, our proposal automatically inherits the undertaking of analyzing the concept of elimination of an alternative. We assumed such undertaking and believe that it was utterly satisfied. In that process, we had to deal with a resilient skeptical argument that exploits a conversion between the possibility of error and the occurrence of cases of accidentally true belief. At the end of our investigation, we present a proposal of knowledge that expresses, in our view, the condition for the eradication of epistemic luck and which allows us to prove the incorrectness of that resilient skeptical argument.

Keywords: relevant alternatives theory, skepticism, the Gettier problem.