Hume and the inactivity of reason

Abstract

In addition to his renowned skepticism about theoretical or speculative reason, it is uncontroversial that Hume also maintains some sort of limitation to rationality in its practical aspects. Several of Hume’s readers consider that this limitation to practical reason can be expressed by the claim that reason alone cannot produce action. I will call this principle the Thesis about the Inactivity of Reason (TIR). Now, although this motivational limitation to reason can be identified, I will argue that there is an ambiguity in the formulation of TIR that allows a possible double interpretation of Hume’s intentions. This ambiguity derives from the claim that reason exerts some influence in the production of actions through an offspring of reasoning, namely, motivational beliefs. Therefore, we might question whether the restrictive expression “alone”, applied to reason, means only, in a weak reading, that (TIR*) beliefs cannot directly produce action – without the mediation or assistance of another different perception – or, also, in a strong reading, that (TIR**) beliefs cannot produce actions indirectly – with the necessary mediation of another different perception, a motivational passion produced by some belief, but without the participation of that passion in determining the end of that action. I try here to defend the strong interpretation according to which Hume also denied the view that reason could, by itself, make passions follow their “obligations”. In support of this, I will basically show that for Hume passions are the only “active” perceptions because they alone are naturally normative from a practical point of view.