The normative character of the general concept of truth

Abstract

I intend to reject the criticisms that pragmatists like Price make of minimalism regarding truth. According to Price, the basic concept of truth is essentially normative in a way that minimalism cannot explain. The normative aspect in question refers to the following rule: if it is true that P, it is correct to assert that P. For the author, this use of the concept of truth is essential. He believes that the basic concept of truth can only be understood by grasping this use. However, minimalism would not be able to explain this aspect of the concept of truth. The fact that minimalism relies solely on instances of the equivalence schema to define the concept of truth supposedly prevents this theory from elucidating the normative character of this concept. I will argue that the mentioned problem stems from a conceptual confusion between constitutive and regulative rules of the meaning of “is true”. Furthermore, I will argue that the kind of pragmatism in question understands the idea of a minimal conception of truth in a way that is distinct, yet compatible with, minimalism. Finally, I will present a form of normativity and a modality of adaptive advantage that reveal the role the concept of truth has likely played in human language.