Hegelian unhappy consciousness in Jean Wahl and Gilles Deleuze

Abstract

The aim of this text is to explain and correlate two interpretations of the concept of unhappy consciousness [conscience malhereuse], developed by Hegel in the Phänomenologie des Geistes: that of Jean Wahl, introduced in Le malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel, 1929; and that of Gilles Deleuze, presented in Nietzsche et la philosophie, 1962. First, we present Wahl's interpretation, which, marked by its defense of the centrality of the notion of unhappy consciousness within the Hegelian work, was decisive for the reception of Hegel in 20th century French philosophy, before the famous Kojève lectures. Next, we describe how Deleuze, in Nietzsche et la philosophie, articulates a critical reading of Hegelianism, in which he also subscribes to the centrality of the unhappy conscience, but associates it, in his own way, with the Nietzschean concept of bad conscience, which is also to be typified. Finally, we relate the two readings presented, which should elucidate the way in which Deleuze takes up Wahl's conceptions in the context of his own critique of Hegel as, according to Deleuze, a philosopher of representation and resentment.