Earnings management in the different governance corporate levels

Abstract

The article investigates the correlation between adherence to different levels of Bovespa corporate governance and earnings management. We take the hypothesis that firms with higher standard of corporate governance have lower earnings management. After a review of the literature on conceptual aspects of accruals, discretionary and non-discretionary accruals, earnings management and its relationship to the levels of Bovespa corporate governance, a research is promoted by applying the model developed by Kang and Silvaramkrishnan (1995) to identify discretionary accruals at different levels of corporate governance. The survey is characterized as descriptive and documentary, with a quantitative approach. We analyzed the companies listed on Bovespa in different governance levels: Level 1, Level 2 and Novo Mercado, in the period between 2000 and 2007. Unlike the results reported in international studies, mercaresearch has not allowed us to infer that a higher level of governance necessarily mean a lower degree of earnings management. It is also concluded that the behavior of firms in earnings management is similar between the different levels of governance of the Bovespa, especially those found in two groups of positive profitability described in this study. This suggests that the level of governance does not interfere in such behavior of managers.