Gaming as the morally good life: utilitarian hedonism, the ethic of gaming?

Abstract

We play because it’s fun and it gives us pleasure, but what, exactly, does that mean? This article explores the connection between the act of gaming and a philosophy of pleasure, that of utilitarian hedonism. Hedonism in this context is not just a system of thought concerning itself with enjoyment and pleasure, but a way to look at gaming as a moral act. The article poses two main questions: Is it possible to study pleasure, and can gaming be enjoyed not just for its mechanisms and social value, but also for its value as a model for and a part of a morally good life? To facilitate this discussion, this article draws heavily on the philosophy of utilitarian hedonism, positioning hedonism not as a system of reckless indulgence, but as a philosophy of communal effort towards a general increase in the level of enjoyment for all involved. By drawing on experience with as well as research on gamer behavior and knowledge of game systems, this article demonstrates how gaming can be seen as a lesson in the importance of increasing pleasure for all. By looking at the use of and meaning of the concept of pleasure, current game research is drawn into question. The many attempts of research to isolate simple formulas for “the good game” appear flawed and simplistic from this point of view. The philosophy of hedonism argues that “good”, “pleasurable” and “fun” are very subjective concepts, and that while a large group of people may agree that a game is “good”, this agreement may not come from a common agreement about what exactly makes the game good. It is in the nature of pleasure to be individual, subjective and situational, which defies attempts at creating a formula for enjoyment both for researchers and designers.

Key words: Game, pleasure, hedonism.