Controvérsia (UNISINOS) - ISSN 1808-5253

A matter of judgment

Cleiton Marcolino Isidoro dos Santos, Aline Maria Ribeiro-Cantú — Sun, 27 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0300

We present Arendt's interpretation of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Judgment in constructing what she referred to as the activity of judging. Our starting point is centered on the inquiries raised by Arendt following the Eichmann trial, addressing the superficiality of the Nazi official's thinking. As a hypothesis, we propose that Eichmann's reflective gap stems from a lack of integration between understanding and imagination, which is capable of facilitating an "enlarged" or "broadened" thinking, characteristics of the Kantian faculty of judgment. Furthermore, this article aims to analyze the convergence between Kant's aesthetic judgment and Arendt's activity of judging to construct independent thinking and autonomous judgment. To this end, the works of both authors will be analyzed, focusing on the conception of aesthetic judgment and the formation of broadened thinking. We conclude that the subjectivity and freedom of thought promoted by Kantian aesthetic judgment, if applied as proposed by Arendt, provide an alternative in situations where norms and rules are insufficient to guide judgment.

Between irony and dialectis

Gabriel Ferri Bichir — Sun, 27 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0300

In this paper, we investigate Kierkegaard's ambiguous relationship with the Romantic tradition in his book The Concept of Irony. We argue that, on the one hand, Kierkegaard remained faithful to the Hegelian critique of romantic irony, since he understood it as a hypostasis of subjectivity and uncontrolled fantasy, and therefore incapable of reflecting on its historical roots. To this end, we focus on Kierkegaard’s criticism of Friedrich Schlegel's novel Lucinde, which, in his view, clearly embodied this poetic disregard for rules. On the other hand, however, we aim to show that Kierkegaard also had great affinity with the tradition he so thoroughly criticized: whether in his style, through the use of fragmentary forms of writing, or in his project of bringing philosophy and life closer together, which lied at the core of the romantic critique of abstract concepts.

Eric Voegelin, Hannah Arendt and totalitarismo

Gabriel Guimar˜ães Marini — Sun, 27 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0300

It is tried, in this paper, to define and oppose Eric Voegelin´s and Hannah Arendt's theorizations about the totalitarian phenomenon. Besides the differences that are brought up by the simple presentation of both theories, the debate by letters between the authors conducts the analysis to a critique of the Arendtian intellectual standpoint by a Voegelinian prism, centered on the argument that Arendt, in its sui generis phenomenology, had the same theoretical flaws of the whole of the German academia criticized by Voegelin, specially noted in his opposition to Edmund Husserl.

Ronald Dworkin's criticism of John Rawls's political constructivism

Gustavo Antonio Pierazzo Santos — Sun, 27 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0300

The article intends to present Ronald Dworkin's analysis of the idea of original position in John Rawls' theory of justice, Rawls' subsequent exposition of his political constructivism, and, finally, Dworkin's new considerations on the matter, in his late work, when he becomes a critic of political constructivism and a defender of moral truth, in defense of egalitarian liberalism, which will be sustained as a more consistent defense of this perspective. To this end, it will initially be shown on which points Dworkin agreed or disagreed with the Rawlsian contractualist idea, in 1973, based on the essay Justice and Rights. Next, John Rawls' exposition on the philosophical bases of his theory of justice will be discussed, based on Conference III of his Political Liberalism, from 1993, including responding to Dworkin. Finally, the article shows Dworkin's turn in 2011, in the book Justice for Hedgehogs, when the author criticizes metaethics and Rawlsian political constructivism, now defending liberal and democratic principles as objective truths.

The Rawls/Habermas debate in the relationship of state/religion in constitucional democratic societyy

Julio Tomé — Sun, 27 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0300

This paper discusses the theories of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas on the state/religion relationship in the public sphere of a liberal democratic constitutional society, presenting the common and divergent points between the theories mentioned above. The aim of this paper is to discuss the idea of public justification (and public reason) in Rawls' thought and the possibility of religious arguments needing to be translated (proviso), questioning whether such an idea would not create too heavy a burden for religious citizens, as Habermas argues. It is believed that Habermas' and Rawls' views on the issue of religion are closer than one might imagine and that the differences are only apparent, since both aim to defend the secular state against the confessional or laicist state in a constitutional and liberal democratic society.

The kantian turn in post-positivism

Mônia Clarissa Hennig Leal, Mateus Henrique Schoenherr — Sun, 27 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0300

On the tercentenary of Immanuel Kant's birth, his practical philosophy seems increasingly relevant and present today. Considering the complexity involved in investigating Kant's legacy, even specifically in relation to Law, the theme of this article will be limited to studying the presence of Kant's practical reason in the post-positivist era of Law, from the so-called Kantian turn (Kantische Wende), and its simultaneous appearance in the post-1988 Federal Constitution jurisprudence of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, based on the example of three paradigmatic cases that express the author's importance for the current phase of Law.

The structural crisis of capital

Robson Machado — Sun, 27 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0300

Situated within the scope of Marxist theory, the main objective of this text is to analyze the socioeconomic conditions that allow us to affirm the existence of a structural crisis of capital and, consequently, a structural crisis of capitalist sociability. To this end, the study takes as its fundamental reference the intellectual production of the Hungarian philosopher, István Mészáros. In the first part of the article, the relationship between the capital system and economic crises is examined. Furthermore, the different types of economic crisis are identified in order to differentiate them from the structural crisis that manifested itself from the 1970s onwards. In the second moment, the need for a socialist alternative and overcoming the capital system stands out, paying attention to the fact that capital and capitalism are distinct phenomena. In the third moment, the structural antagonisms of capital are discussed and, in effect, the opposition between genuine production and destructive production is highlighted. In view of this, attention is drawn to the absolute limits of capital. In the fourth moment, the worsening of chronic unemployment is analyzed as one of the phenomena that constitutes the activation of the absolute limits of capital. It concludes in defense of popular organization and the maturation of the revolutionary conditions of the socialist alternative, highlighting the ideological resurgence of the forces of capital that aim to restore its hegemony.

"We, the refugees"

Thaina Junges Costa — Sun, 27 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0300

This study aims to analyze the current Brazilian legislation for refugees and assess whether it is sufficient to address the issues raised by Hannah Arendt. For decades, Brazil has been dealing with the forced displacement of people, and this research seeks to answer the following question: Do Brazilian migration policies resolve the problems highlighted by Hannah Arendt in the text We Refugees? To address this question, a bibliographic methodology will be employed, drawing on We Refugees and The Origins of Totalitarianism, both by Hannah Arendt. Furthermore, public policies adopted in Brazil will be examined to determine whether these measures effectively meet the needs identified by the author.

Leibniz's critiques of Descartes' theory of perception

William de Jesus Teixeira — Sun, 27 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0300

The aim of this paper is to try to answer the critiques made by Leibniz against Descartes’ theory of perception. The first of these critiques concerns the so-called ‘idea-picture’. The answer to this critique will be given on the basis of the Cartesian theory of ‘causal dissimilarity’ between the object of perception and the sensations brought about by it. The second critique refers to the qualia, that is, the supposed disconnection and arbitrariness between the content of the mental representation (the idea) and its material referent. The answer to this critique will be given by means of the psychophysical correlation that Descartes calls ‘institution of nature’. Finally, the last critique relates to the non-sensorial perceptions. In order to answer this critique, it will be showed that Descartes held that matter is infinitely divisible and consequently he defended that there are many portions of bodies whose perception escapes the reach of our senses. These discussions will allow us to conclude that, in what concerns the ‘idea-picture’ and the qualia, Leibniz would have made a mistake in his critique, and as to the non-sensorial perceptions, the German philosopher would have developed a conception of perception which was built on notions put forward in Descartes’ physics.

The normative character of the general concept of truth

Yuri de Lima Rodrigues — Sun, 27 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0300

I intend to reject the criticisms that pragmatists like Price make of minimalism regarding truth. According to Price, the basic concept of truth is essentially normative in a way that minimalism cannot explain. The normative aspect in question refers to the following rule: if it is true that P, it is correct to assert that P. For the author, this use of the concept of truth is essential. He believes that the basic concept of truth can only be understood by grasping this use. However, minimalism would not be able to explain this aspect of the concept of truth. The fact that minimalism relies solely on instances of the equivalence schema to define the concept of truth supposedly prevents this theory from elucidating the normative character of this concept. I will argue that the mentioned problem stems from a conceptual confusion between constitutive and regulative rules of the meaning of “is true”. Furthermore, I will argue that the kind of pragmatism in question understands the idea of a minimal conception of truth in a way that is distinct, yet compatible with, minimalism. Finally, I will present a form of normativity and a modality of adaptive advantage that reveal the role the concept of truth has likely played in human language.

Presentation

Sun, 27 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0300

Translation of the original: “And the last shall be first’: the master-slave dialectic in Hegel, Nietzsche and Fanon”

Bräulio Marques Rodrigues — Sun, 27 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0300

This article compares the ideas of Hegel, Nietzsche and Fanon on the dynamics and outcome of relationships of domination and subordination. By examining these authors’ views on various aspects of these relationships—for example, the significance of the Other, the roles of ressentiment and of labor, and the importance of aggression—the article identifies differences and commonalities in their discussions. This comparison leads to the conclusion that, despite fundamental differences in their emphases, analyses, and even their political perspectives, the three writers concur on the eventual liberation of the subordinated.

Translation of the original: "What are plants saying about us? Your brain is not the root of cognition", by Amanda Gefter

Vitória Biscaro Coelho, Nara Miranda Figueiredo, Paulo Sérgio de Figueiredo — Sun, 27 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0300

This is portuguese version of the text "What are plants saying about us?" originally published by Nautilus Science Magazine. The text explores the complex capabilities of plants, using as an example to challenge traditional cognitive science views about the human mind. Based on the work of Barret and Calvo, the author explains that plants have the ability to respond to their surroundings with intelligent behavior. This allows one to question whether neurons are necessary for cognition. Calvo argues that they are not. When reading the text, as the capabilities and actions of plants are reported, we increasingly question assumptions such as the need for the brain and/or mental representations for cognition. The author presents, in a clear and introductory way, a critique of thinking about cognition on the basis of machine functioning analogies, in favor of understanding living beings based on the ideas of embodied, extended, embeded and enactive cognition (4E) and ecological psychology.

Review of "Widmer E. T., Left-Kantianism in the Marburg School"

Leonardo Pança — Sun, 27 Apr 2025 00:00:00 -0300

Written by Elizabeth Widmer and published in 2024 by De Gruyter, Left-Kantianism in the Marburg School the thirteenth volume in the series New Studies in the History and Historiography of Philosophy, which aims to reevaluate the history of modern and contemporary Western philosophy. In this work, Widmer claims that the term Left-Kantianism is more appropriate to identify the theoretical divergences about the political philosophy of this left-wing movement than the term “ethical socialism”. According to Widmer, Left-Kantianism, which originated in the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism, is characterized as a philosophical movement that intends to renew Kant’s critical methodology to critique capitalism. I believe the main contribution of this work is to revitalize the study of Left-Kantianism, demonstrating how it can still provide an interesting basis for a social and political critique, as well as offering new perspectives on the normative dimension of the Marburg school, which contrast with the historically prevailing view that assumes the movement only as logicist and scientistic.