Translation of the original: "Origins of perception"

Abstract

In this article, which expands on one of his two Petrus Hispanus Lectures uttered in Portugal, Burge investigates the origins of perception. The author argues that perceptual states are constitutively representational, that is, they possess own conditions of accuracy, in contrast to mere states of information registration. Moreover, Burge maintains that perception involves the capacity to track particulars and their attributes in the environment. Based on an analysis deeply informed by empirical psychology, especially vision science, the article argues that perception constitutes a basic and irreducible form of mental representation, whose explanation requires reference to representational content and to conditions of accuracy and error. Burge introduces the concept of perceptual objectification to explain how perceptual systems overcome the underdetermination of proximal stimulus and come to represent entities in the distal environment. In this context, he assigns a central role to perceptual constancies, understood as capacities to represent environmental invariants under variations in proximal stimulation conditions. Finally, Burge distinguishes perception both from non-perceptual forms of sensory registration and from theories of mental representation that reduce it to purely syntactic, functional, or informational processing. The article thus offers a clear and influential formulation of a representationalist conception of perception, widely discussed in contemporary philosophy of mind. In this sense, the text serves as an excellent introduction to the author’s thought regarding perception and mental representation.