Stuart Mill and Hannah Arend sobre a espontaneidade

Abstract

This article examines the conceptions of spontaneity in John Stuart Mill and Hannah Arendt, arguing that, in both, it constitutes an essential element of freedom of action and, consequently, of the good life and the renewal of the world — albeit in distinct ways. In Mill, also treated under the terms of originality or individuality, spontaneity depends on the basic freedoms that enable its expression; through them, higher capacities develop, necessary both for individual happiness and for the progress of society. In Arendt, spontaneity coincides with freedom itself, which is realized in action and discourse within the political realm. Through action, human beings inaugurate the new and reveal who they are before others, thereby living a political life — which, for Arendt, constitutes the specifically human life. The article also examines the limits of each conception and their possible complementarity: Mill, by conceiving freedom primarily in negative and civil terms, emphasizes the individual sphere as the space of spontaneity; Arendt, in turn, restricts it to the political realm, which requires conditions of action that modernity tends to erode. Taken together, however, both authors highlight the centrality of freedom and the dignity of action and singularity, especially in the face of modern dangers — such as the uniformization of behavior and opinion — that threaten spontaneity and, with it, the possibility of a fully human life and the renewal of the world.