Beyond consensus

Profound disagreements between epistemic peers as the driving force of scientific development

Abstract

This article argues that some kind of deep disagreement can play an epistemically productive role in scientific development, even when it does not lead to some kind of consensus. Faced with Fogelin's pessimistic diagnosis, an analysis is proposed that articulates the methodology of scientific research programs (PIC) of Imre Lakatos with the methodological pluralism of Paul Feyerabend to understand this type of controversy in detail. The central contribution consists of showing that deep disagreements between epistemic peers in science can force refinements, readjustments and expansions of the empirical content available to followers of a PIC. The argument is developed from the historical and conceptual analysis of the conflict produced between the valence bond (VE) theory and the molecular orbital (MO) theory in quantum chemistry, characterized here as a profound disagreement between epistemic pairs. The case study shows how the systematic comparison between incompatible theories can increase the overall empirical content, while the program in a progressive phase imposes explanatory demands on those undergoing a recessive change, forcing readjustments in their protective belt. This comparative dynamic avoids the loss of content that would result from following eliminativist or dogmatic strategies while enabling the production of new advances in both programs.