New objections to the problem of unconceived alternatives

Seungbae Park

Abstract


The problem of unconceived alternatives can be undermined, regardless of whether the possibility space of alternatives is bounded or unbounded. If it is bounded, pessimists need to justify their assumption that the probability that scientists have not yet eliminated enough false alternatives is higher than the probability that scientists have already eliminated enough false alternatives. If it is unbounded, pessimists need to justify their assumption that the probability that scientists have not yet moved from the possibility space of false alternatives to the possibility space of true alternatives is higher than the probability that scientists have already moved from the former to the latter space.

Keywords: changing spaces, Humean skepticism, scientific pessimism, scientific realism.

 


Full Text: PDF



ISSN: 1984-8234 - Best viewed in Mozilla Firefox

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License [Updated on September 23, 2016].

São Leopoldo, RS. Av. Unisinos, 950. Bairro Cristo Rei, CEP: 93.022-750. Atendimento Unisinos +55 (51) 3591 1122 Ext.: 3219




SCImago Journal & Country RankCrossref Member Badge Crossref Similarity Check logo